

THE FUTURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS

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ABSTRACT

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United Nations Peace Operations have been used to contribute to international peace and security since the inception of the United Nations (UN). During the Cold War era, these peace operations were designed on a traditional model and used primarily to resolve conflicts between states. Following the Cold War, the rise in intra-state conflicts (insurgencies, genocidal ethnic violence, civil wars, etc.) has complicated traditional peace operations. The new missions are increasingly becoming multidimensional operations; they are more complex; they sometimes involve a comprehensive approach. This SRP examines the range of current peace operations — ranging from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. It identifies effective ways to conduct such operations. It examines theoretical concepts underlying these operations at both the strategic and operational levels. It analyzes the changing nature of these conflicts, the strategic challenges and opportunities underlying them. It considers prospects of post-Cold War peace operations. It concludes with recommendations for the qualitative improvement of future peace operations.

THE FUTURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS

The UN was not created to take mankind to heaven, but to save humanity from hell.

—Dag Hammarskjöld,
Secretary-General of the United Nations (1953 to 1961)

Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld's observation remains relevant, although threats to peace and security have drastically changed in the 21st century. The United Nations (UN) continues as the sole credible and legitimate international organization that serves all mankind. UN Peace Operations have been used to contribute to international peace and security since the UN's inception. The UN has undertaken a number of peacekeeping operations in different parts of the world with varying mandates, scopes, and duration – seeking to resolve various kinds of conflicts. During the Cold War era, these peace operations were designed on a traditional model and primarily sought to resolve conflicts between states.¹ Following the Cold War, the rise in intra-state conflicts (insurgencies, genocidal ethnic violence, civil wars etc.) has complicated traditional peace operations. New missions are likely to be carried out by multidimensional operations; they are more complex; they sometimes involve a comprehensive approach. These new missions are multi-disciplinary and increasingly focused on building peace during a post-conflict transition, which requires integrated programs. The tasks of peacekeeping missions have become more diverse and extensive in recent days; their success predominantly depends on the use of multi-disciplinary experts, including non-military components.

This SRP briefly examines the evolution and theoretical concepts of UN Peace Operations, noting challenges and opportunities and various reform efforts. It focuses

primarily on analyzing fundamental aspects of peace operations — personnel, mandates, materials, and funding. It concludes with recommendations for more effective peace operations.

Evolution of Peace Operations

The League of Nations, the forerunner to the UN, was established in 1919 under the Treaty of Versailles “to promote international cooperation and to achieve peace and security.” It ceased its activities after having failed to prevent World War II. The UN was established in 1945 to replace the League of Nations in order to promote global collective security. The Preamble of the Charter of the UN states that one of the primary functions of this organization is “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”² Chapter I of the Charter states that one of the main purposes of the UN is:

... to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.³

Chapter VI of the Charter calls for all member states to contribute to the pacific settlement of such disputes. In the event of non-compliance with Chapter VI, in Chapter VII, the charter authorizes military and non-military means of enforcing cessation of activities that threaten international peace:

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.⁴

Such UN actions are conducted primarily through the employment of the armed forces of member nations to mitigate threats to international peace, broadly known as

UN peacekeeping operations. The UN contributes to peacekeeping activities in various ways. A peacekeeping operation may result from Security Council initiatives to quell a conventional conflict.⁵ Or a peacekeeping operation may result from local initiatives, such as a request for assistance by local parties to the conflict.⁶ Or one could also result from an agreement brokered by third parties that sought UN assistance for implementation.⁷ The way the UN becomes involved in a mission often dictates its structure, objectives, and its likelihood of success.

During the Cold War, when the world was deeply polarized into hostile sectors, the ideal of global collective security was hard to achieve. In an environment where deep mistrust between these hostile blocks dominated international politics, there was little fertile ground for the UN to flourish as conceptualized. However, even in the depths of the Cold War era, the UN was sometimes called upon to dampen smaller conflicts, to keep them from flaring up and thereby prevent them from leading to a catastrophic confrontation between the superpowers.⁸

Such endeavors were undertaken through modest means; they were designed to achieve relatively realistic objectives, such as mediation of isolated conflicts, separation of hostile armed forces, and monitoring of ceasefires. They were executed through unarmed military observer missions (first seen in the Middle East in 1947) and armed peacekeeping missions (first seen in Sinai in 1956). Such UN activities were carried out through the military capabilities of willing member states. They came to be widely accepted as UN peacekeeping. The UN Truce Supervision Operation (UNTSO) was created to monitor the peace after the Arab-Israeli War in 1948. The UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was established to monitor the

ceasefire after the India-Pakistan War of 1947. The UN sanctioned efforts to negotiate a ceasefire to the Korean War; the UN established a demilitarized zone along the 38th parallel, which to this day remains authorized by the UN and serves to sustain the ceasefire. A UN Emergency Force (UNEF) was created in 1956 to supervise a resolution of the Suez Crisis. These are examples to successful traditional UN peacekeeping. These operations have also helped prevent a relapse to violence in instances where a peaceful settlement has yet to be reached.

With the end of the Cold War, a global environment emerged that was more conducive to envisioned UN peacekeeping roles.⁹ With dissolution of the bipolar Cold War structure, genuine global cooperation for collective security seemed more likely. In this environment, peacekeeping is one of the many tools available to address the threats to international peace and security. Accordingly, peacekeeping remains a flagship activity of the UN. But today peacekeeping is a much broader and complex activity. It may involve disarming former combatants and helping them re-enter civilian life to restore order and safety to public places. It may involve protecting human rights and enabling refugees to return their homes. It may involve promotion of national reconciliation and restoration of effective governments. It may involve organizing elections and establishing a national government, rule of law and security institutions.¹⁰

The UN has various means at its disposal to promote collective global security: the Secretary General's good offices; peace-building assistance provided by dedicated offices and UN agencies; coercive tools of the Security Council (such as sanctions and enforcement); and the ability to call upon regional, bilateral, and multilateral actors and their various instruments. These are remarkably diverse tools at the UN's disposal.

They range from large military deployments to small unarmed observer forces — from specialized police, rule of law, and civilian operations to complex integrated missions.

Theoretical and Doctrinal Concepts

UN peacekeeping is defined as “the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.”¹¹ Consistent with established principles of UN peacekeeping, Marrack Goulding defines peacekeeping as:

Field operations established by the United Nations, with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under United Nations command and control, at the expense collectively of member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them, acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum necessary.¹²

All peacekeeping operations share some key features: They are based on the basic principles of peacekeeping – consent, impartiality, and no use of force except in self-defense, and in defense of the mandate.¹³ The UN published its capstone doctrine in 2008 to provide principles and guidelines for conduct of peace operations. *United Nations Peacekeeping: Principles and Guidelines*, a publication of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), lists numerous factors for successful operations, drawing on lessons of the best practices that the world body has derived in its more than six decades of experiences.¹⁴ However, these theoretical concepts of peacekeeping are based on best case scenarios, so they often neglect ground realities. Hence these well-meaning peacekeeping doctrines are often found wanting.¹⁵

Consent of the parties to conflict is one of the basic principles of peacekeeping. But very often consent can be manipulated. One such example arose during one of the key tasks of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). UNIFIL was tasked to demark the “Blue Line” that had been supposedly agreed upon by both Israel and Lebanon. However, this consent has been manipulated by both sides to signify different locations on the ground. So the UN effort failed as the conflict raged on, making UNIFIL seem inept. Additionally, the UN has been involved in peace enforcement missions to which all parties have not consented. Goulding argues strongly for the need for continuing consent and cooperation from all parties; he sees consent as essential for successful operations.¹⁶ Consent of all parties makes peace operations less vulnerable and more acceptable. Consent increases confidence in an eventual settlement among the parties and reduces the risk to troops contributing countries (TCCs). Similarly, withdrawn consent impacts adversely on the mission. Goulding cites the classic example of Egypt withdrawing its consent to UNEF I in 1967. Then UN peacekeepers could do little to prevent the war.¹⁷ A similar situation arose with the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) when Eritrea did not cooperate with the UN mission. However, consent of all belligerents may not always be available when the UN authorizes a peace enforcement mission. In such cases, the UN may authorize use of forceful actions, including possible combat actions to restore peaceful order.

Impartiality is another well-meaning doctrine that nonetheless creates operational dilemmas. Impartiality is crucial to maintaining consent and cooperation. Peacekeepers must scrupulously avoid activities that might compromise their image of impartiality. In some post-conflict situations, one of the sides may be violating the terms governing

cessation of hostilities. So it may be prudent for peacekeepers to admonish the violating party. Often the UN is criticized for inaction in such matters, which can itself be seen as biased. In such a situation, the UN's strictly equal treatment of both sides may jeopardize the mission. In the worst case, it may be regarded as UN compliance with the aggressor. For example, UNIFIL is often blamed for its inaction when the Israeli air force violates Lebanese air space. Impartiality may be viewed differently when the UN is supporting a government rather than suppressing conflict between two or more warring nations. The Korean example is significantly different from traditional peacekeeping. In Korea, the Security Council has authorized the U.S. and its allies to use force against North Korea in support of South Korea. Likewise, at times peacekeepers have to take strong measures to restrain violators of agreements. This was evident in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where peacekeepers often take strong actions against the belligerent parties who violate the peace agreement. UN Operations in Congo (MONUC) provide a unique example in which the UN is supporting the DRC government against various illegal armed groups. However, confusion arose regarding UN neutrality and impartiality during the Bukavu crisis in May-June 2004 when MONUC's credibility was damaged for not responding in a timely and appropriate way.¹⁸

Another conceptual issue concerns the legitimacy and credibility of peace operations. These concepts play key roles in peace operations. Timely establishment of a UN mission's legitimacy and credibility is vital: The international community will support only legitimate responses to credible threats to peace or to national sovereignty. But in order to have greater legitimacy in the eyes of the local actors, the UN peacekeeping mission must have a multinational image. Hence, it is desirable that the

mission have as many national flags as possible. Legitimacy and credibility on the ground is sustained by the mission's conduct and actions; by the UN's firmness and fairness in exercising the mandate; and by the UN's use of force, respect for local customs, and respect for national sovereignty.

Failure to deploy in a timely manner will also tarnish the credibility of the peacekeeping mission. Early and timely deployment can often be a key to success. However, the UN is an umbrella organization: It brings together many nations to respond to crises and threats. Its structure prevents rapid decision-making. This structural problem has at times even challenged the capacity of the UN to perform its core function, such as in Rwanda and in Darfur. Further, UN- deployed troops must be adequate for the task at hand. The size and capabilities of deployed forces may actually be a function of the degree of political support that the mission enjoys from major powers, rather than a function of actual needs.

When deployed, the peacekeeping force must be robust and capable of establishing a credible deterrence. Robustness means "having a force that has the credibility to deter those who mean harm with power to take the use of force."¹⁹ A robust force is needed to enforce the mandates, to abide by Rules of Engagement (ROE), to maintain an effective force posture. A robust force is well-equipped, has an effective command and control system, has enabling and supporting elements (including fire power), and has an effective logistics system. A robust force must be capable of defending itself and other mission components. It must be able to carry out the mission's mandate. This usually means a relatively large and well-equipped force is needed to carry out a firm mandate. However, UN constraints on military force – "non-

use of force except in self defense and in the defense of the mandate” – do not seem to allow for the need for a robust force. It is particularly important that the peacekeepers have ROEs that authorize sufficient use of force to deny an aggressor’s attempt to seize the initiative and thwart the peacekeeping mission

Various Reform Efforts

UN peacekeeping has undertaken meaningful reform efforts in the post-Cold War period. In June 1992, Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali submitted “An Agenda for Peace,” in which he described various aspects of peace operations and suggested how the UN could respond to various forms of conflicts.²⁰ The UN had undertaken many complex peacekeeping missions in the 1990s, not all of which were successful. Its strategy, modality, and policies were insufficient to assure appropriate UN responses to genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia. Under such circumstances, UN peacekeeping operations came under harsh scrutiny, and the UN commissioned a panel to review the issue under the chairmanship of Lakhdar Brahimi. In August 2002, this committee presented its findings in a *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, a document widely known as the Brahimi Report.²¹ It identified various shortcomings, which are summarized below:²²

- Requirement to develop strategies for conflict prevention and peace-building strategies.
- Requirement for sufficiently robust mandates to identify UN peacekeepers as credible deterrents capability denying the initiative to the aggressor.
- Requirement to develop a mechanism that can provide accurate strategic analysis.

- Requirement to quickly establish central leadership of new missions.
- Requirement to respond rapidly to critical situations, such as genocides.
- Requirement to enhance headquarters capacity to plan and support peace operations.
- Requirement to establish Integrated Mission Task Forces for mission planning and support.
- Requirement to integrate information age technology and practice into peace operations.

The Brahimi Report serves as the 21st century vision for UN peacekeeping operations.²³ It sets the tone for major reforms to make peacekeeping more responsive, more capable, and more effective. As a result of these changes, the world has already seen unsurpassed levels of demand for UN peacekeeping activity: Over 118.000 personnel from 118 countries will have deployed for peacekeeping as of March 2010.²⁴ Peacekeeping today involves a much broader approach as civilian and police components serve hand-in-hand with the military.

The Brahimi Report was well accepted by the UNHQ and the member states. As a result, the DPKO prepared a reform strategy entitled “Peace Operations 2010.”²⁵ It establishes reform policies and procedures for peacekeeping, focusing on five key areas: personnel, doctrine, partnerships, resources, and organization.²⁶ It encourages “recruitment and retention of highly qualified personnel by providing structures and support they would need to build a career as United Nations Peacekeepers.”²⁷ However, it is not an easy task for the UN to recruit uniformed professional manpower, with the exception of some military retirees. Yet a significant number of uniformed personnel

joined the UN service after retirement for UN civilian jobs. The UN has a system to recruit serving military professionals from TCCs to serve on temporary assignments with UN.

The second area of reform was to articulate doctrinally what peacekeeping missions are suited to achieve and what they are not. Reform also focused on recording experiences that have worked or not worked in the past. Another key area was “the establishment of frameworks for interactive partnership.”²⁸ This has resulted in identifying some regional and international bodies as key peacekeeping partners as well as identification of the areas in which such partnerships will be best suited. Attempts are being made to establish such partnerships, particularly with regional organizations and NGO/INGOs. But much needs to be done to establish such partnerships. Even so, the UN has entered into new relationships with the African Union (AU) in a number of missions in Africa and has established greater cooperation with the World Bank. Peacekeepers’ ability to implement the mandate is directly related to its capacity to enforce the mandate; hence another area of reform focuses on strengthening the UN’s ability to secure the essential resources to execute operations. The fifth area is “the establishment of integrated organizational structures at headquarters and in the field”.²⁹

Further, in June 2007, the General Assembly approved Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s proposal to restructure the DPKO and to create a separate Department of Field Support (DFS). These reforms were designed to increase available resources at the headquarters and build new capacities with integrated structures to match the growing demands for UN peacekeeping activities.

Almost decade after implementation of Brahimi report, in July 2009 the DPKO and the DFS jointly prepared a planning document titled “A New Partnership Agenda – Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping” as another effort to reform peace operations. Their report represents the most current thinking on future peace operations. It recognizes that their UN peacekeeping partnership stands at a cross roads. It notes the need to continue ongoing discussions about the future directions of UN peacekeeping in order for the UN to best serve the international community. It calls for setting up a “new horizon” of “achievable immediate, medium, and long term goals.”

This new-horizon paper recommends many reform measures that can make peacekeeping a more efficient UN venture. It very correctly asserts that for peace operations to be successful, a wide range of partners must participate. Such broad partnerships will enable a clearer political strategy and direction. They will also enhance cohesive mission planning and management. Their document also recommends methods for faster deployment as well as the need for clarity and delivery of critical roles. It also admits the need for improving UN efficiency in crisis management. Likewise, it identifies the need to project future needs using a capability-driven approach. Finally, it cites the need for new field support with a view to expanding the partnership for peacekeeping. This document offers some strong recommendations for making a qualitative improvement in peacekeeping in order to meet new challenges - including those of personnel, mandate, materials, and funding.

Challenges

The Cold War's end found the UN in greater demand than ever before to deal with peace and security issues.³⁰ Although peace operations have become more credible and legitimate tools for resolving conflicts in the post-Cold War era, meeting the

increasing demand has exceeded the capacity of the world body. Conflicts in the 21st century have tended to be characterized by uncertainty, complexity, fluidity, and persistence. These features make peace operations increasingly challenging and demanding. Mingst and Karns observe that:

The United Nations will continue to be challenged to respond to diverse threats to international peace and security...require member states to reconcile the dilemmas of the post-Cold War world in making choices about where and how to utilize UN capabilities for enforcement.³¹

Over the last few years, UN peacekeepers have responded unprecedented numbers, with a budget of US\$ 7.8 billion. To meet these unprecedented requirements, ongoing peace operations have encountered various challenges in four key areas – personnel, mandate, materials, and funding. In the following sections, these challenges are examined in detail.

Personnel

UN Peace Operations are often criticized for an inability to generate peacekeepers from developed countries. Security of their personnel, possible health hazards in mission areas, lack of medical facilities (including day and night evacuation capabilities), and national political attitudes toward host countries are some of the factors cited by countries that are reluctant to provide peacekeeping personnel. Most TCCs are seeking more active participation during the planning process of a particular mission in order to gain more transparency. The strategic military cell established in UNHQ for UNIFIL is an example in which TCCs assumed a more active role.

Some prominent TCCs — such as Canada, France, and United Kingdom (U.K.) — are highly selective in the matter of contributing personnel. These countries prefer to commit their personnel in key staff/command positions only for selected missions. Some

European countries like Ireland, Spain, Norway, Sweden, and Finland are also highly selective in their troop contributions. Most North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, including the U.S. and U.K., are heavily committed in Iraq and Afghanistan, which gives them valid excuse not to commit more troops to UN peace operations. Whatever the reasons, the UN lacks capable, well-trained, and well-equipped peacekeepers from developed countries, and this shortfall undermines the effectiveness of peace operations.

Lack of female participants is yet another problem that some regard as a gender inequality issue. Efforts are underway for increasing female participation. Female participants can perform a wide range of tasks. If they are employed in appropriate roles, they will certainly enhance the UN's overall effectiveness.

TCCs have pledged to provide standby troops and staff officers at short notice to be deployed in accord with standby arrangements. However, because of efforts to sustain complex surge capacities in potential theaters, standby arrangement systems have not worked effectively to facilitate timely deployments and adequate projections of UN forces. Demand for peacekeepers is high; most TCCs that regularly contribute troops are at the point of exhaustion. TCCs are currently committed to providing almost three times more troops than are actually deployed. However, because many of their troops are needed in the home country for preparation and training, they are unable to provide more troops. In the meantime, they are re-deploying their rotated peacekeeping troops.

New TCCs have volunteered in recent years; however, most of them either do not possess the capabilities to meet force requirements or they are not in position to

commit more troops to meet UN requirements. This personnel issue has been exacerbated by high rates of turnover of uniformed personnel in peacekeeping operations. Most TCCs rotate their troops every six months, which is the time they need to understand the dynamics of the area of operations. This constant and relatively quick turnover has resulted in the non-retention of experienced manpower.

Another concern is the caveats that the contributing countries bring into the area of operations. National caveats are not common among TCC. However, they are mission specific and also differ from mission to mission and TCC to TCC. Fortunately, very few TCC have such caveats. But these caveats can prevent the mission leadership from adopting the best course of action available. National caveats often defeat the purpose of peacekeeping. They undermine the effective performance of the mandated task and reduce the mission's positive impact on the ground. Peacekeepers also have a tendency to respond first to directives from home countries, which often undermines the established chain of command. This problem arises when the mission leader perceives a need to take action beyond a purely defensive posture. Such decisions may pose risks that some member states are unwilling to accept. So in times of crisis the force commander's authority may be severely limited.³² Sometimes because of national caveats, field leaders have problems in maneuvering military components from one position to another within the area of operations when a failure to move or delay a move presents a greater risk from staying in place.³³

Unlike traditional missions that are headed by military commanders who exercise complete control, most recent peacekeeping missions have been led by political appointees (Special Representative of the Secretary General - SRSG).³⁴ There must be

a balance between civil control of peacekeeping and the requirement of understanding of military strategy. Occasionally peace operations have given rise to command and control challenges between civilian and military components in the field and UNHQ. It is appropriate for UNHQ to serve as a strategic level HQ, but on occasion tactical decisions made at UNHQ to satisfy Security Council members and senior management have been seen as micro-management of the field mission's authority.³⁵ Similarly, at times political leaders at UNHQ or field missions make decisions without considering their military implications.³⁶

The concept of hybrid missions has added complexity to peace operations.³⁷ Indeed, this concept presents some significant challenges in many mission areas – in command, control, and communication; in interoperability; in disparities of pay and allowances; in logistical support; and so on. Most of these issues are related to personnel, mandate, material, and funding. Hybrid missions are more political in nature than traditional missions. So the decision-making process in such mission is complex and slow. Hybrid decision-making requires frequent consultation and consensus regarding the selection of senior leadership, composition of troops, TCC selection, deployment timeline, etc. In hybrid missions, it is also difficult to compensate for an inappropriate mix of troops from outside the hybrid framework. Leaders must compromise on the quality and professionalism of troops for the sake of hybrid composition. Third-party support is often required to bring the regional peacekeepers up to the force requirement standards. Host countries may accept hybrid forces for political reasons, such as the UNAMID mission in Darfur. Such missions may not proceed smoothly; they will need support from a lead nation.

Mandate

A clear, unambiguous, and achievable mandate is essential for successful peace operations. Lack of a suitable mandate will make it difficult to achieve the desired end state of the mission. There are occasional complaints about disconnects between Security Council mandates and resources allocated to implement them. But often such problems are caused by a lack of political commitment during implementation of the mandate in the field and by stakeholders' failure to assume ownership of the mission. The UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) is a classic example of a mission that failed because of flawed implementation. Similarly, the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda was also insufficiently resourced, thus unable to prevent horrific genocide. Complex mandates can dilute forces, such as in missions in Africa which have lengthy mandates that include laundry lists of problems. Mandates must be applied without favor or prejudice to any party. MONUC provides an example in which the area of operations is so vast that UN forces and supporting elements are simply insufficient to perform mandated tasks. .

Materials

Modern peace operations demand robust forces, appropriately equipped and augmented with necessary enabling units. However, the UN is having difficulty in generating critical enabling assets - such as utility helicopters, tactical helicopters with night-flying capabilities, fixed-wing reconnaissance squadrons, transport aircrafts, unarmed air vehicles (UAVs), and other such assets. For example, the UN Mission in Chad (MINURCAT), the UNAMID and MONUC still lack aviation assets designated in force requirements. These shortfalls adversely affect successful execution of mission mandates. Assets like Information (Intelligence) capabilities, frigate-sized vessels

carrying helicopters, military engineer capabilities, and fully funded quick impact projects (QUIPs) are critical requirements for peace operations. But these assets are not readily available. QUIPs become futile when it takes a year to ensure funding.

Often, the militaries of the various contributing nations provide varying qualities of equipment and trainings, which contributes to issues of compatibility and interoperability. The economic well-being of contributing countries also has significant impact on the mission. TCCs with strong economies often offer huge economic incentives within their areas of operation. But their economic advantage may create problems when they operate jointly with an economically disadvantaged TCC. For example, in UNAMID, the single greatest morale issue among deployed troops is the overall inability to provide meaningful humanitarian assistance on the spot to the Internally Displaced Populations (IDPs) — to the extent that IDPs have increasingly given the cold shoulder to peacekeepers because of this inability to help them out.

The UN currently lacks resources to sustain its field operations. It is unable to surge the numbers of peacekeepers and to support their huge logistics demands. There is little compatibility in UN operations among diverse personnel and equipment from over 100 TCCs. Timely deployments of peacekeepers during the initial phase of deployments and sustaining them once deployed are important to garner benefits of effects-based peace operations. Lack of strategic-lift capability and facilities to manage large deployments in the field is adversely affecting rapid UN deployments of personnel and materials. Decision-makers should consider the cost effectiveness of chartering strategic lift capabilities or procuring appropriate aircraft to support a large number of field missions. The UN may have to compromise monetary factors to fulfill its

operational requirements. The UN also lacks operational and tactical lift capabilities in the mission area. If the UN is going to satisfy the current demand for peacekeeping operations, it must find solutions to a myriad of material problems.

Funding

The current peacekeeping budget exceeds 7.8 billion dollars annually. The peacekeeping budget is shared among the UN member states. Occasionally, the partial or even full cost of a particular mission is shared by a host country or a small group of interested countries. UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) is an example in which costs have been shared by Kuwait and some Gulf nations. Similarly, host nations Pakistan and Afghanistan provided accommodation, security, and transportation for the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) in their respective countries. The U.S. and Japan pay a significant percentage of the UN peacekeeping budget, whereas some economically prosperous countries, including China and India, pay a small amount, glaringly disproportionate to their economic capabilities.

The UN is also experiencing budgetary issues in sustaining peace operations. Member states are not paying their dues on time. UN peace operations almost collapsed when the U.S. did not pay its dues in the 1990s. Modern multi-dimensional and robust peace operations obviously demand more resources. However, the cost of UN peace operations is much less than any high-profile military operations. One report claims that one day of the first Gulf War cost more than the annual budget of all concurrent UN peace operations.

Future Prospects

The end of the Cold War has given UN peace operations enormous opportunities to contribute to international peace and security, which is obviously a credible and

legitimate role. President Barack Obama has emphasized the importance of peace operations by citing that the promotion of peace and security as one of the pillars global stability.³⁸ To maintain its credibility and legitimacy, a mission must be based on a clear and deliverable mandate with resources and capabilities to match; it must be conducted confidently and professionally to earn the respect of the involved parties and the host country's population. UN peace operations are deployed in volatile environments, so they are likely to be tested for weakness early in the mission. Therefore, peace operations must be robust in all aspects to deter or counter all possible threats. Post-Cold War conflicts involve many actors; not all parties in these conflicts are amenable to negotiations. Also, the peace established in conflict-ridden nations is often fragile. Many non-state actors may attempt to destroy the fragile peace. Accordingly, a robust force with rapid deployment capabilities should characterize future peacekeeping forces.³⁹

Rapid evolution of their doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures has enhanced effectiveness and standardization of UN peace operations. Strengthening the standby capabilities and over-the-horizon forces will provide the UN with the flexibility to generate troops in timely manner. The UN has made significant efforts to increase interoperability and preparedness of the troops through its reform program. Many new countries are willing to participate in peacekeeping and willingly carrying out high-risk operations in Chapter VII missions, such as MONUC and UNAMID. The UN's New Horizon concept is believed to be a breakthrough for addressing the growing need for multidimensional and robust peacekeeping.

The UN now needs to focus on minimizing TCCs' caveats and restrictions — as well as those of host nations, parties to the conflict, and other formal and informal

entities. DPKO has developed a system to clarify TCCs' issues by negotiating memoranda of understanding to eliminate national caveats prior to deployments. Military concepts of operations, force requirement documents, and guidelines to TCCs should have a provision that explicitly prohibits TCC caveats.⁴⁰ TCCs must be made aware that once they contribute troops for a particular mission, these troops will operate under tactical control of mission leadership. TCCs should clearly understand that they are responsible only for administrative and logistical requirements — not for operational control.

Leveraging the strength of the Regional Peacekeeping Forces (European Union - EU, AU, NATO etc.) and alliances of the willing is a remarkable achievement of current peace operations. Hybrid missions have certainly added a new dimension to peace operations; however, their effectiveness is yet to be determined. Nonetheless, such missions can strengthen UN relations with regional organizations. They will also enhance regional players' sense of ownership and will alleviate cross-cultural issues and thereby reduce peacekeepers' vulnerability to undermining their image. Such missions are comparatively less costly. Regional solutions based on a hybrid concept can succeed with sufficient attention to capacity-building and standardization of such organizations. If problems are addressed carefully, regional organizations can play a dynamic role by participating side-by-side with international organizations. Clear Standing Operating Procedures will mitigate most misunderstandings and eliminate weak areas. A better selection of key international staff and expediting offices under the necessary figureheads can enhance hybrid missions.

In recent years, five permanent members of the Security Council (P5) nations made little or no direct contributions to UN peacekeeping. However, the world's most powerful militaries are recently heavily engaged in responding to global terrorism and security problems, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan. So it may not be fair to say that the P5 and developed nations are not contributing to UN peacekeeping in the contemporary world. Sizeable forces from France, Italy, Spain, and China are currently serving in UNIFIL. Main battle tanks, heavy weapons such as Mistral, artillery guns, UAVs, and similar equipment and weapons have been deployed in UNIFIL for the first time in the history of UN peacekeeping. UK and Germany have also contributed maritime assets at the initial stage of the 2006 deployment. China has also contributed to several other missions.

We must not overlook the fact that Multi National Forces (MNF) played a vital role either as a leading element or as a bridging force in the past. The U.S.-led MNF stabilized the Haitian situation before the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was deployed in 1995. Similarly, the French-led MNF stabilized the situation in the Ivory Coast prior to UN deployment in that country. Likewise, in Ituri province of DRC, a French-led MNF stabilized the situation before the UN could deploy peacekeepers.

Even so, the price for the equipment needed to sustain the UN peacekeeping missions cannot be compared to contributions of blood. Yet the P5's contributions in Darfur in heavy equipment and logistics support are enormous. Nevertheless, P5 nations and developed countries need to contribute more to make peace operations more credible and effective. In order to encourage greater P5 troop contributions to UN peacekeeping in the future, other UN member states should acknowledge that the fight

against terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan is a common global problem. If this global menace is defeated, the world will be much safer. Then these nations will be relieved from committing troops to such operations and can commit their troops and resources to UN peace operations.

Similarly, UN assurances of better quality of life, safety and security arrangements, sound reinforcement or evacuation plans, mitigation of health hazards, and provisions of night evacuation capabilities will build confidence among TCCs and increase their willingness to contribute troops.

Multinational commitments of police resources, which give such responses wider legitimacy, make peacekeepers particularly suitable to deal with law and order issues, correctional tasks, and multinational organized crime. However, a rapid deployment of police is not as critical as deployments of military personnel. Nonetheless, creation of a UN “Standing Police Capacity” is a good initiative. Rule of law and effective correctional systems are essential for creating a secure and stable environment. So it is a global responsibility to generate quality police and correctional officers and to deploy them appropriately..

The UN needs to be more focused in planning and in implementing its peacekeeping operations. But it has improved in the wake of a series of reform efforts. Yet there is more to be accomplished. The UN has formulated impressive policies, but too often these policies are not implemented. For example, some of the aspects of Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) have not been implemented as they were conceived. In other cases, the UN compromises too easily in exercising its new approach when the going gets difficult. The proposed strategic reserves concept has

not materialized mainly due to budgetary problems. Likewise, the standing police proposal received favorable attention because it seemed cost-effective. But the UN needs peacekeeping troops more than it needs police.

Without a sound plan, a mission will not succeed; therefore, there should be no compromise in any shortcut approach to or negligence in planning. The IMPP must be thoroughly implemented to produce a workable plan. As the Brahimi Report suggested, development of more responsive stand-by arrangement is essential for rapid deployments. Late deployments in critical situations are sometimes worse than no deployment. The UN has witnessed the horrific results of its inadequate rapid deployment capability. Yet it has done little to fix this problem. This international forum must consider creating and maintaining a deployable nucleus HQ and a few rapidly deployable reserve units. With such assets, the UN can provide first-entry forces to carry out critical missions. Such reserves could be provided by regional arrangements or by identifying lead nations or over-the-horizon forces for a probable mission area. The UN needs to maintain a reliable TCCs list in addition to its list of traditional TCCs to generate timely responses and to maintain a robust posture. This initiative will enhance UN's credibility and deterrence capabilities.

Workable mandates with requisite authorizations of clear missions from the Security Council will demonstrate international will. Consent of the parties; impartiality and uses of force only in self-defense; protection of civilians, and defense of the mandate will continue to serve as basic principles of UN peacekeeping. UN credibility will suffer if it authorizes missions with limited mandates or only partial consent from conflicted parties.

Establishment of a separate UN Department for Field Support has enhanced the logistics and administration of peace operations. Implementation of focused logistics support mechanisms for deployed forces and more effective COE/UNOE management systems for deployed units will facilitate peace operations in a more structured and effective manner. The UN should focus on streamlining its slow and ponderous bureaucracy, acknowledging that “the best plan implemented too late is not as good as an average plan implemented in time.” For example, time needed in the current contracting system significantly affects deployment timelines, even when a rapid deployment is absolutely needed. The primary role of DFS is to support DPKO, but their new chain of command may evince a future gap. This problem should be sorted out in a timely and practical manner.

Despite scores of technical and practical problems, UN peace operations provide the most credible, legitimate, and impartial tool to enhance global peace, security, and stability. The post-Cold War global situation has increased the need for more UN peace operations to respond to the various hotspots of world. Demand for UN peace operations will continue to grow because threats to international peace and security are growing daily.

Conclusion

The UN must acknowledge that what might have been good in the past will no longer suffice. It cannot continue to conduct peacekeeping without developing vital capabilities. Failure to acknowledge current shortfalls puts future missions at risk. This is particularly urgent because the demand for peacekeeping keeps rising, while the resources to support it become increasingly difficult to find. This is not just a routine

numbers game involving troops and equipment. The mandates are becoming increasingly complex and creating new expectations. In effect, the UN's future is at risk.

Peace operations have entered in new era since the end of the Cold War. But various challenges in this new era have made peacekeeping more complex and multi-dimensional, in contrast to traditional peace operations. Fortunately, policy makers in New York have given new direction to peace operations by making the missions multi-disciplinary to overcome the new challenges. But, new dimensions have also offered new opportunities. Indeed United Nations peace operations are the most viable, credible, and legitimate tools for maintaining international peace and security.

Susan Rice, the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, has correctly portrayed future peacekeeping requirements: "We need peacekeeping operations to be planned expertly, deployed more quickly, budgeted realistically, equipped seriously, ably led, and ended responsibly."⁴¹ In recent years, the UN has approved profound changes designed to improve its ability to meet new 21st century peace operation challenges. However, as the SRP has shown, this admirable international security forum must muster sufficient human, financial, and logistical resources to continue to carry out its noble endeavor of peacekeeping.

Endnotes

¹ The United Nations was created by a world community determined to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" during an international conference of 50 countries held in San Francisco in April 1945. The delegates deliberated on the basis of proposals, worked out by the representatives of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States at Dumbarton Oaks, United States, in August-October 1944. This origin of the UN accounts for the increased responsibilities granted to the victorious nations of World War II within the Organization; their leading role prevails today in the dominant roles of the five permanent members of the Security Council. The signing of the treaty that describes its status marked its creation: The Charter of the United Nations.

² Charter of the United Nations.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid. ... Article 41 lists the non military means of enforcing cessation of activities that threaten international peace. Such measures include “complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.” Article 42 reads – “Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockades, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of members of the United Nations.”

⁵ Such as the establishment of United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) after the War for Palestine in 1948, United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) to end the Suez Crisis in 1956, UNEF II to end the October War in 1973, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to end Operations Litani in 1978 and the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNICOM) after the Gulf War in 1990-91.

⁶ Some examples of such missions are the UN Special Committee on the Balkans (Greece) in 1947 to end the Greek civil war, the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) over the Kashmir dispute in 1948, the UN Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) in 1958, The UN Operations in Congo in 1960 and the UN Forces in Cyprus in 1964.

⁷ The UN Temporary Executive Authority in West New Guinea in 1962-63 was as a result of U.S. mediation, the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) I in 1988-91 was U.S. mediated, the UNAVEM II in 1991-95 was brokered by Portugal, U.S. and Soviet, and the UN Protection Force in Yugoslavia in 1991 was UN Mediated.

⁸ Williams J Durch, The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, The Henry L Stimson Center, ISBN 0-312-0600-7, (1993), pp.1-2.

⁹ New role as envisaged in post-Cold War era is defined in - An Agenda for Peace - Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping; Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992; A/47/277 - S/24111, 17 June 1992. The terms preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping are integrally related and as used in this report are defined as:

- *Preventive diplomacy* is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.

- *Peacemaking* is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.

- *Peace-keeping* is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.

¹⁰ A New Partnership Agenda – Chartering a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping, Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, UNHQ, NY, July 2009, pp. 2

¹¹ An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peace Making and Peacekeeping, Report of the Secretary General pursuant to the statement adopted by the summit meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992.

¹² Marrack Goulding, The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 69, No. 3 (Jul, 1993), pp. 455.

¹³ United Nations Peacekeeping: Principles and Guidelines, UNDPKO, UN HQ, NY, (2008)

¹⁴ United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines list the following factors as being important to achieving success: a) Genuine commitment to a political process by the parties to work towards peace. b) Clear, credible and achievable mandates, with matching resources. c) Unity of purpose in the Security Council, with active diplomatic support. d) Supportive engagement by neighboring countries and regional actors. e) Host country commitment to unhindered operations and freedom of movement. f) Integrated UN approach, effective coordination with other actors and good communication with host country authorities and population. g) Missions need to demonstrate their credibility, strengthen their legitimacy and promote national and local ownership.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Marrack Goulding, pp.454

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ian Johnstone, Dilemmas of Robust Peace Operations, Robust Peacekeeping: The Politics of Force, New York University, Center on International Cooperation, Feb 2006, pp.68

¹⁹ Anonymous.

²⁰ An Agenda for Peace...

²¹ Brahimi Report, http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/docs/summary.htm

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ FGS/OMA/DPKO/ UNHQ's monthly statement.

²⁵ In the year 2005, the DPKO UNHQ reviewed the implementation of Brahimi Report. Based on lessons learned, the DPKO prepared a reform strategy titled "Peace Operations 2010", which evaluated the capacities that need to strengthen to meet the DPKO's goals over the next five years.

²⁶ “Peace Operations 2010” reform strategy, excerpts from the Secretary General’s report to the General Assembly on 24 February 2006.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Karen A. Mingst & Margaret P. Karns, *The United Nations in the Post-Cold War Era*, Second Edition, Westview Press, Boulder Colorado, 2000, pp.1

³¹ Ibid., pp.113

³² Jean-Marie Guehenno and Jake Sherman, *Command and Control Arrangements in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, International Forum – Challenges of Peace Operations, Version of 22 October 2009, pp.6

³³ MONUC experienced severe crisis when the 10th Military Region Command (MRC) of DRC was divided and the authority of their commander undermined by Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma (RCD-G) supporters, military, and civilian. Support from a foreign country in the form of weapon, ammunition, and equipment was evident. On May 26, 2004 fighting broke out in Bukavu between elements of the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) and dissident soldiers loyal to suspended deputy commander of the 10th MRC Col. Jules Mutebutsi. Laurent Nkunda, a notorious RCD-G officer started an offensive from his stronghold in Goma vicinity to support Mutebutsi. Some 35 km North of Bukavu he stopped his advance, perhaps on orders of Vice President Ruberwa, leader of RCD-G. MONUC initially encountered reluctance from some of its contingents to mobilize their force in Bukavu as they argued that they need order from national authority to redeploy from original location to new location. Such action delayed the MONUC reinforcement to Bukavu; as a result, caused damage, which could have been avoided with prompt deployment of MONUC forces.

³⁴ Military Force Commanders wear double hats as head of the mission and head of the military component in most traditional peacekeeping missions, i.e., – UNIFIL, UNFICYP, UNDOF.

³⁵ Author’s personal observation while working in Military Planning Service, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UNHQ NY on secondment from Nov 2002 to Nov 2005.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Changing nature of conflict in the post-Cold War era and especially the conflict having regional effect for, e.g., the conflict in Darfur has a spillover effect in Chad and Central African Republic. Similarly the conflict in west - Africa Sierra Leone, Liberia and Ivory Coast are interrelated. It is the same lot of militias roving from one area to another; in such scenarios **establishment of regional command structure of PKO** could be given thought of and new concept of **MOU arrangement with the regional organization or sub regional organization** could be considered. Similarly the joint PKO (Hybrid missions) could be the new dimensions or future of PKO.

³⁸ U.S. President Barack Obama, in his address to the UN General Assembly on 23 Sep 2009, presented four pillars that he believe are fundamental to the future: a) non-proliferation and disarmament; b) the promotion of peace and security; c)the preservation of our planet; and d) a global economy that advances opportunity for all people.

³⁹ The aim of the PKF force should be to stabilize the situation in shortest possible time and hand over to other international law enforcing agencies to consolidate the peace achieved (ideal would be UN formed police unit) and at the same time immediately start peace building activities directed at the root cause of the conflict.

⁴⁰ DPKO prepare these documents and share with TCCs prior to troops deployment.

⁴¹ The US Ambassador to the United Nations, Ms. Susan Rice's statement on 23 September 2009.